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2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

16 May 2000

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Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. **Baali**	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President)	(Ecuador)
later:	Mr. **Baali** (President)	(Algeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate *(continued)*

1. Mr. **De Ruyt** (Belgium) said that his delegation shared the deep concern expressed by Portugal on behalf of the European Union and by many other States parties. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been concluded some 30 years earlier, the ultimate goal had been total nuclear disarmament. At the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty there had been legitimate reasons to hope that that goal could be achieved. The end of the cold war, permitting bilateral arms reductions, and the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones had convinced the parties to the Treaty to extend it indefinitely.

2. After the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, there had been further promising developments. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been concluded; the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) had been ratified by the United States Senate; additional States had acceded to the NPT; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in Africa.

3. Unfortunately, hopes had recently been dashed by the emergence of some serious threats. The decision of India and Pakistan to pursue their nuclear programmes challenged the very spirit of the non-proliferation regime. While the declared intentions of India and Pakistan concerning the CTBT were good, it was time that the two countries put their words into action by acceding to it and by declaring a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and participating in the negotiation of a treaty on the matter. Also of concern was the development in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear programmes prohibited by the NPT.

4. The unexpectedly slow rate of ratification of the CTBT was disappointing. His delegation hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would shortly follow the example of the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation and that the Japanese efforts in informal consultations would be successful. A further cause for concern was the inability of the international community to open negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Insistence on linking the negotiations to other matters, however understandable, was counterproductive.

5. A further worrisome development was the threat to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) posed by the declared intention of the United States to deploy a national missile defence system. It was essential that the programme should not compromise existing strategic balances or prevent the reduction of the strategic arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

6. Despite the grim picture, there had been some positive developments in the previous five years, including: the establishment of an international surveillance system in Vienna; a substantial reduction in deployed nuclear arms; an initiative by the United States and the Russian Federation to put designated fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); initiatives by the United Kingdom and France regarding reductions, increased transparency and a unilateral moratorium with respect to the production of fissile materials for military purposes; the adoption of a Model Additional Protocol designed to strengthen IAEA safeguards agreements; important efforts by the NPT Exporters' Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enhance the transparency of export control regimes on nuclear items; and the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Parliament. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would shortly begin to negotiate START III.

7. It was important that the four States that remained outside the NPT should be present at meetings held to discuss the non-proliferation regime. The Malaysian suggestion was appreciated, but the proposed consultation mechanism might be too cumbersome. Perhaps the President could be given a mandate to engage in informal consultations with those countries and to report at least once annually on his efforts.

8. His delegation believed in the gradual evolution of nuclear disarmament and advocated the creation of an information exchange mechanism to allow nuclear-weapon States to keep the international community informed about efforts and progress in disarmament. The Government of Belgium had confidence in the existing structures and recognized the usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, of which it would be assuming the Presidency. As President, its chief

priority would be to resume the activities of the Conference, which had been paralysed by a lack of consensus on the programme of work. Reasonable objectives for the next session of the Conference on Disarmament were to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes, revive the working group on negative security assurances and elaborate mandates enabling the Conference on Disarmament to deal adequately with the problems of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. **Mr. Downer** (Australia) said that the value of the NPT had been demonstrated by the growth of its membership. Ten years earlier some 60 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had been outside the Treaty. That number had dropped to four: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Moreover, a number of States had turned away from possession of nuclear weapons and had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty enabled States to participate in nuclear trade and cooperation for peaceful purposes without fear of compromising non-proliferation objectives. It was a measure of the Treaty's success that the spread of nuclear weapons to 25 States, as projected in the 1960s, had not come to pass.

10. In honour of ANZAC Day, on which Australians remembered those who had lost their lives fighting for a better world, he wished to announce his Government's Six-Point Plan to promote progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament: the immediate entry into force and full implementation of START II and the early commencement and completion of negotiations on START III; the early entry into force of the CTBT; immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; universal adoption of the IAEA additional protocol and early establishment of an integrated safeguards regime; effective export controls on nuclear trade; and universal accession to the non-proliferation treaty regime.

11. Nuclear disarmament was a central obligation of the Treaty and remained a key Australian policy objective. Good progress had undoubtedly been made towards nuclear disarmament, even if not entirely uniform or consistent. The primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lay with the two largest nuclear-weapon States. His Government looked to the United States and the Russian Federation to deliver the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals promised by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and encouraged them to continue their preliminary discussions on START III. The smaller nuclear-weapon States had also contributed through withdrawal from deployment and reduction of forces. All five nuclear-weapon States had supported negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and four of them had announced a moratorium on the production of such material. His Government was committed to working towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, but it was well aware that reductions must be made incrementally, by means of a realistic, balanced approach that took into account strategic realities.

12. It was worth recalling that article VI obligations were directed to all parties to the Treaty. It was important for non-nuclear-weapons States to reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament goals, for example, by encouraging the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Australia had been a strong supporter of both those objectives. All States gained a vital security benefit from the assurance that others in their region were not pursuing nuclear weapons programmes. Universal accession to the Treaty remained an urgent priority. From both non-proliferation and disarmament standpoints, parties to the Treaty must adhere fully to the IAEA safeguards obligations. Australia had been an active proponent of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system and had been the first country to ratify the Additional Protocol to improve and extend IAEA inspection and access rights. His delegation urged the Conference to support the Additional Protocol strongly and pave the way for it to be regarded as a necessary part of non-nuclear-weapons States' safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

13. Although the CTBT had not entered into force, it had been firmly established as a powerful international norm against further nuclear testing. With 155 signatories, it was approaching the status of a universal treaty. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was welcome. All five nuclear-weapons States had signed the CTBT and therefore had an obligation under international law not to frustrate its purpose. His Government welcomed the nuclear-weapons States' moratorium on testing and would continue to encourage the United States Administration

to mobilize popular support for the CTBT in order to convince the Senate of its worth.

14. His delegation looked to the Conference on Disarmament for the immediate commencement and speedy conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, one of the most urgent non-proliferation steps the international community could take. Pending negotiation, it hoped that China would join in the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and that India, Israel and Pakistan would do likewise.

15. His delegation welcomed the opening for signature of treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa similar to those in the South Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean. It looked forward to further progress on establishing such a zone in Central Asia.

16. The provisions of article IV of the NPT, which dealt with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were essential to the balance of rights and obligations of States parties. Implementation had been large-scale and effective through IAEA and regional cooperation arrangements. But such cooperation required a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. Nuclear-export controls were an essential means of ensuring that non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty were met. For the vast majority of States parties, export controls were a help rather than a hindrance. His Government had long held to the principle that significant nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapons States should be dependent on their acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, a principle that was endorsed in the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 Conference. It believed that accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol should also be made a condition of supply.

17. While the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 were a challenge to the non-proliferation regime, actions by non-parties could not be seen as a failure of the Treaty itself. His delegation urged India and Pakistan to take prompt action and to reduce tension in the region by signing the CTBT, participating in negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, maintaining their moratoriums on nuclear tests and applying stringent export controls. Its hope was that India and Pakistan would ultimately sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. In examining progress on implementation of the Treaty, it would be necessary to address issues of compliance. IAEA was still unable to resume its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq. Despite recent improvements in relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not fulfilling all its obligations under the safeguards agreement; it must preserve the information necessary for IAEA to verify its initial inventory declaration in order to be able to benefit fully from the peaceful nuclear cooperation offered through the light-water reactor project.

19. Despite challenges, the Treaty remained the world's best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It was the only global treaty dedicated to the containment of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination, and it delivered major security benefits to all States.

20. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that Brazil was participating for the first time in a review conference of parties to the Treaty. Like many others Brazil had been critical of the asymmetrical obligations deriving from the Treaty, all the more so as the essential bargain it contained had not been respected during the cold war era, when the nuclear-weapon States had increased their killing capacity. In the 1990s, however, a turning point had been reached and reductions in nuclear arsenals had become a real possibility. Brazil had also been encouraged by the decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which ensured that the nuclear-weapon States would be more accountable for achieving total elimination of nuclear weapons.

21. Meanwhile, important developments had been taking place in Brazil and Latin America. Brazil's 1988 Constitution had stipulated that nuclear energy would be used in the territory for peaceful purposes only. A full-scope safeguards agreement with Argentina had been concluded, providing for control by a bilateral agency and IAEA. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had gone into force in Brazil and the other countries of the region. In view of the auspicious international trends, Brazil had decided to accede to the NPT on the understanding that effective measures would be taken towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Unfortunately, the current international environment was less favourable than in the post-cold-war era, despite the recent encouraging decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT.

The geopolitical situation appeared less stable, regional tensions had added to the complexities of global balance, and the deployment of new weapons systems and modernization of existing ones seemed to indicate that the illusion of absolute security was once again being pursued. The irreversibility of nuclear arms control measures could not be taken for granted.

23. His delegation was disturbed that thousands of nuclear weapons continued to be kept on hair-trigger alert. Rationales for the possession and use of nuclear weapons had been reinforced. Deterrence doctrines had been expanded to deal with threats of all kinds, rather than purely the survival of the State, and the threshold for use of nuclear weapons had been lowered. Continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and the assumption that nuclear weapons would be maintained indefinitely was unacceptable. The nuclear-weapon States insisted that their weapons provided security benefits but reserved to themselves alone the right to own them, a position that was discriminatory and unsustainable. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them. The nuclear tests in South Asia should have alerted the international community to the risks posed by nuclear proliferation and delayed action on nuclear disarmament. There were also worrisome signs of the gradual acceptance of the de facto nuclear status of States not yet parties to the Treaty which had failed to renounce the nuclear weapons option. Such an attitude ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty. The Conference therefore had a twofold task: to urge non-States parties to accede to the Treaty without conditions and without delay, and to call on States parties to refrain from any action that might frustrate fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty.

24. The Conference faced daunting challenges and its deliberations would be closely followed by decision makers around the world. Its outcome would have a strong bearing on the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Conference must build on the numerous contributions which Governments, experts, individuals and non-governmental organizations had put forward over the years, particularly on interim measures and subsequent steps to be taken in the area of nuclear disarmament.

25. The New Agenda Coalition, of which his country was a founding member, had been a catalyst for those ideas. It proposed a programme of action that did not exempt any country from its responsibilities towards others. The measures listed would be incumbent on the entire international community, including the five nuclear weapon States and the three States not yet parties to the Treaty. The ideas of the New Agenda Coalition were not in themselves novel. What set the New Agenda apart was its composition, timing and comprehensive, balanced and achievable programme of action.

26. In his view, the main guiding principle of the Conference should be to preserve and consolidate what had been achieved in 1995. He hoped that, given the enormous challenges facing the Conference, States would demonstrate greater flexibility and a deeper sense of responsibility in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and confirm its vitality by agreeing to concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

27. **Mr. Saudargas** (Lithuania) said that the Preparatory Committee's work had been less productive than had been hoped; however, a new instrument such as the strengthened review process needed time to develop and could be modified at the end of the first cycle if necessary. Despite problems of implementation and enforcement, the Treaty's fundamental purposes remained credible. His Government therefore supported those who had called for a revitalization of the review process aimed at preserving the integrity of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament", developing a mechanism to transform principles and objectives into action and extending the review process from three to four sessions.

28. While welcoming the accession of nine additional States to the Treaty since 1995, he urged four States which were not parties to accede thereto. He was pleased that the Russian Federation had ratified START II and hoped that that agreement would be implemented in a timely manner and that negotiations on START III would soon begin. He also commended the Governments of France and the United Kingdom for having taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals and the measures taken by some nuclear weapon States to increase transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament.

29. The momentum resulting from the 1999 Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must not be lost. He therefore welcomed the recent ratification of that Treaty by the Russian Parliament and urged other

States whose ratification was required for its entry into force, especially India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to sign and ratify it without delay. He also hoped that the Review Conference would promote the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the near future.

30. It was disturbing that, rather than working towards disarmament, States parties were increasingly required to devote their efforts to stemming proliferation. The Review Conference should therefore evaluate the dangerous course of events in the South Asian sub-continent and consider ways of preventing further deterioration in that situation. His Government was in favour of a progressive reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and of enhanced efforts to close some nuclear weapon facilities, dismantle and destroy weapon-related materials, place excess nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards and pursue transparency and openness. The Conference on Disarmament should set up an appropriate mechanism to consider nuclear disarmament issues.

31. He welcomed efforts to expand nuclear-weapon-free zones through, *inter alia*, the Treaties of Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Pelindaba and Bangkok and hoped that similar zones would be established in Central Asia and the Middle East. In that regard, he welcomed the Disarmament Commission's adoption of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

32. While IAEA played a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime, its safeguards could not be effective unless all States parties honoured their commitments. His Government had acceded to virtually all IAEA conventions in the field of nuclear energy and was working to bring its legislation on export controls into line with that of the Nuclear Supplier Group States.

33. Despite some difficulties, the Treaty had proved effective; he was certain that a compromise could be reached and new forward-looking initiatives developed and endorsed for implementation during the next review cycle.

34. **Mr. Axworthy** (Canada) said that, in the fifty years since Canada had given up its own nuclear-weapon capacity, it had spent time and resources to build a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. With the NPT at its centre, the regime painstakingly constructed over decades had proved its worth, yet past achievement was no guarantee of future security. The cold-war truths of the twentieth century were giving way to the shifting uncertainties of the new one.

35. The challenges facing the Conference were varied. One concern was the tendency of some to justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons of mass destruction or as political status symbols. No less disturbing were the ambitions of others to acquire nuclear capacity. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan had added a frightening dimension to the insecurity in that region and had flagrantly violated international norms against nuclear proliferation. With the dismantling of warheads came heightened concern about the possibility of illicit transfers of weapons-grade material and technology. The drift towards unilateral options was also troubling. In the United States, the rejection of the CTBT was a significant step backward, while the proposed unilateral national missile defence system would have serious implications for the NPT regime. In the meantime, the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament had precluded any movement relating to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. At least 50 States parties to the NPT had not yet concluded nuclear safeguards agreements.

36. To be sure, there had also been promising developments since the NPT had been extended indefinitely five years earlier. The number of States remaining outside the Treaty had been reduced from 10 to 4, and the CTBT had been signed by the vast majority of States. Nuclear weapon-free zones had been established. IAEA had adopted measures that significantly strengthened the nuclear safeguards regime. Significant reductions in nuclear weapons and the elimination of entire weapons systems by the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France, as well as deep cuts in the nuclear forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had contributed to a more stable security environment. In addition, the Russian Federation had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT.

37. While the record of the past five years might be mixed, it was clear that the end of the cold war had not removed the threat of nuclear weapons. Before the global nuclear non-proliferation regime could wither

by active design or malign neglect, it was essential to reaffirm international commitment and refocus global energy on strengthening the regime, as the best guarantee of common security.

38. Canada's goal was to give new meaning to the foundation of the NPT: a promise by those without nuclear weapons not to acquire them, in exchange for a commitment by those possessing such weapons to give them up eventually. The pledge made when the NPT had been extended indefinitely had been to ensure permanence with accountability. Canada's approach to that goal was threefold. First, it was committed to promoting and protecting the universality of the Treaty. Second, it would work to secure agreement on an updated five-year disarmament and non-proliferation action plan containing concrete objectives and goals. The action programme should be designed to find a way to bring the CTBT into force as soon as possible, end the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and begin negotiations on a ban on fissile material production, continue START reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, stress the need for the integrity of the ABM Treaty to be maintained, call on all nuclear-weapon States to enter into disarmament negotiations once the United States and the Russian Federation had reduced their strategic warheads to the 1000-2000 range, extend the application of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and encourage new ones, promote the universalization of IAEA safeguards, and further improve verification and inspection capacity and effectiveness. Another matter to be addressed was the growing number of countries which were developing or acquiring missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yet no treaty, code of conduct or set of guidelines existed to define responsible behaviour in those areas. The Missile Technology Control Regime could be made more effective by adopting stricter export controls on relevant technology and widening participation.

39. Third, Canada would work towards a more robust NPT review and assessment process through more frequent tracking, discussion and documentation of the progress made in translating commitment into action. Real accountability also required real transparency, and the active contribution of representatives of non-governmental organizations could do a great deal to enhance the openness of the Conference's work and mobilize public support and participation in its efforts.

40. The first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly had been one recommending that atomic weapons should be eliminated from national arsenals. Ever since then, the international community had grappled with how best to contain the nuclear genie. Imperfect as it might be, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime provided the answer. A strong and effective NPT remained indispensable. The NPT remained the most widely adhered-to security accord in history because, despite the frustrations, it offered the best hope for minimizing the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the best vehicle for advancing common security.

41. **Mr. Ivanov** (Russian Federation), after conveying the greetings of President Putin and his best wishes for the success of the Conference, said it was symbolic that the review of the NPT was being held at the turn of the new century, when the foundations for a new system of international relations were being laid. His delegation had come to the Conference with the strong conviction that the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty would serve the interests of the entire world community.

42. New threats to international security and stability had emerged in the form of local conflicts, international terrorism and militant separatism. A tendency to undermine the existing system of strategic stability, attempts to build national stability at the expense of the interests of other States and the use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law were equally dangerous and in fact were a direct invitation to a new arms race. In short, the world had come to a crossroads: either it would preserve through joint efforts the positive achievements in non-proliferation and limitation of nuclear weapons, or it would face the real prospect of chaos and uncontrollable military power. It was extremely important, therefore, that efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should be made an integral part of a fair and democratic world order based on mutual trust and equal security for all States and regions.

43. The Russian Federation was fully committed to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. It was resolved to encourage steady progress by all five nuclear Powers towards nuclear disarmament. A few days earlier, it had ratified START II and the 1997 package of anti-ballistic missile agreements. The implementation of those instruments would constitute a

major step towards nuclear disarmament by reducing the overall level of strategic offensive weapons in Russia and the United States by approximately two thirds as compared to 1990 levels. It had also decided to ratify the CTBT.

44. The Russian Federation continued to implement earlier agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Pursuant to START I, it had already eliminated more than 2,000 ballistic missiles and over 950 land- and sea-based launchers, some 30 nuclear submarines and more than 80 heavy bombers. Total reductions under START I, when completed, would amount to some 40 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States.

45. Furthermore, all Russian ballistic missiles had been de-targeted. His Government continued to implement unilateral initiatives related to tactical nuclear weapons, removing them from surface ships, multi-purpose submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Destruction of nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, artillery shells and mines was about to be completed, and half the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and for nuclear-gravity bombs had been destroyed. The Russian Federation was prepared to go further by considering steps to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to the level of 1,500 warheads each. That historic opportunity could be missed, however, if the United States plan to deploy a national ABM system, in violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, was translated into action.

46. Further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could be considered only in the context of preservation of the ABM Treaty. That instrument had opened the way for deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons on a stable and transparent basis. The prevailing system of arms control agreements was a complex and fragile structure, and, once one of its key elements had been weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would undermine all the disarmament agreements concluded over the past 30 years, and the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime would grow.

47. Compliance with the ABM Treaty in its current form, without any modifications, was a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT. The national security interests of every State and of the international community as a whole were affected. His Government was convinced that missile threats and proliferation could and should be dealt with without violating the ABM Treaty, and it was prepared to engage in the broadest possible consultations on the subject, both with the United States and multilaterally. It had proposed the establishment of a global missile and missile technologies non-proliferation control system as a real alternative to the vitiation of the ABM Treaty. The choice of that option was crucial not only to the fate of the non-proliferation regime, but also to the favourable unfolding of international affairs.

48. The task of strengthening the NPT was beyond the scope of the nuclear Powers alone. The universality of the Treaty remained an urgent concern, and those States which had not yet signed it should be actively encouraged to do so. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones made a meaningful contribution to the development and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia was a party to the majority of international agreements on such zones, and the fact that it had no nuclear weapons beyond its national territory also illustrated its contribution to the consolidation of that regime. It urged other nuclear Powers to follow its example.

49. A ban on the production of fissile materials was another urgent issue. Russia was decommissioning its last remaining facilities for the production of weapons-grade plutonium and had ceased such production several years earlier. His delegation would work actively towards negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue.

50. The future of the Conference on Disarmament was in grave doubt because of an erosion in the atmosphere of compromise which had prevailed earlier in that forum and the desire of some States to establish linkages between issues. For the second year in a row, the Conference was simply marking time, and a choice must be made to renounce immediate advantage in the interests of the common cause.

51. The NPT created a favourable climate for growing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The IAEA safeguards were an effective instrument for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a powerful confidence-building measure. Thirty years earlier, by concluding the Treaty, the international community had rejected the nuclear arms race. Confirmation of its indefinite extension by the Conference would vividly

demonstrate the commitment to make non-proliferation one of the inviolable principles of international security in the twenty-first century.

52. **Mr. Chalyi** (Ukraine) said that his Government had long supported the ideas embodied in General Assembly resolution 54/54 G, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda". The voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Ukraine and other newly independent States after the collapse of the Soviet Union was an act of great moral significance and political courage that should be properly reflected in the final document of the Conference.

53. Although Ukraine had possessed the world's third greatest nuclear potential, it had acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in 1994. It had eliminated 77 per cent of its strategic offensive weapons under START I and planned to complete that process by the end of 2001. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and hoped that talks on START III would soon be resumed.

54. In affirming the importance of the ABM Treaty, his Government considered that no action taken by a State party with a view to lessening the possibility of a missile attack should constitute a violation of its obligations under that instrument. It also hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would join the Russian Federation in ratifying the CTBT.

55. The fundamental principle of non-proliferation had been undermined by developments in South Asia and challenged by States not parties to the NPT. It was imperative that those States should accede thereto as non-nuclear States without delay. It was also important to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a valuable role in maintaining regional and global security and should be established in the regions of Central Asia and the Middle East.

57. IAEA efforts to strengthen the safeguards regime were commendable. Since 1995, Ukraine had greatly improved its non-proliferation record; it had concluded with IAEA an agreement for the application of comprehensive safeguards in 1997 and planned to sign the additional protocol to that agreement in 2001.

58. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a legally binding instrument, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France and China had provided his Government with security guarantees that had been among the key factors in its decision to accede to the Treaty. His country's experience could be of value to the development of a universal, legally binding document on assurances. In that regard, he considered that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, established in 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament, should be re-established. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and hoped that the Council would pursue further expansion of the application of security assurances as part of the non-proliferation review process.

59. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the chair.*

60. **Mr. La Fortelle** (France) said that the success of the Review Conference would require a comprehensive, balanced approach to the three key areas covered by the Treaty – non-proliferation, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and disarmament – and that his Government was convinced that the documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference were of fundamental importance to the review process.

61. France had committed itself unequivocally to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference. It had completely phased out its land-based nuclear component, reduced its airborne and sea-based components, ratified the CTBT, closed its Mururoa test site, ceased production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, reduced the alert status of its nuclear forces on two occasions, provided the security assurances mentioned in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and ratified the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

62. His Government was committed to enhanced transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure in support of disarmament efforts and, to that end, had opened its test site in the Pacific to international visits and published a document entitled "Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation:

French policy". He commended the success of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, recently illustrated by the Russian Federation's ratification of START II, and urged States which had not yet ratified the CTBT and, in particular, those whose ratification was necessary to its entry into force, to sign and ratify it in the near future. It was particularly unfortunate that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the next step in the multilateral disarmament process, had not yet begun.

63. In a time of change and instability, it was essential to preserve and implement decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nothing would be more dangerous than attempting to redraft the fundamental principles and objectives contained in that key document every five years. Securing the early entry into force of the CTBT and launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were principles that had been recognized in a consensual manner as the only approach that would make it possible to secure the adherence by all States, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty, to universal, non-discriminatory, verifiable and hence credible standards. It would also enable States that had chosen not to accede to that instrument to demonstrate their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, thereby strengthening the Treaty itself and helping to ease regional tensions, especially in South Asia and the Middle East.

64. At a time when the risk that the arms race would be revived and the strategic balance broken was not negligible, it was indispensable for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to pursue the global reduction of their nuclear arsenals, which remained incommensurate with those of other nuclear-weapon States. His delegation therefore attached great importance to maintaining strategic stability, of which the ABM Treaty was an essential element, and was prepared to discuss new proposals for countering the slowness of the disarmament process both during the Review Conference and in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to a mandate adopted by consensus.

65. His Government was concerned at the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly hindered IAEA efforts to secure implementation of that country's safeguards agreement by verifying that all nuclear material subject to guarantees had been declared. Iraq was also a cause for concern. Thanks to the verification programme carried out since 1991, IAEA had been able to form a coherent picture of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme. He therefore regretted that IAEA had been unable to fulfil its mandate in that regard since 16 December 1998 and welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and the inauguration of a process leading to the resumption of controls. France, for its part, had signed a strengthened safeguards agreement with IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community on 22 September 1998 and would do its utmost to ratify it as quickly as possible.

66. His Government was cooperating with numerous countries and institutions in an effort to promote the widest possible access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a climate of confidence that was contingent on security, safety and transparency. The international community required an assurance that cooperation and exchange could not give rise to diversion of materials; hence the need for effective, objective and transparent export controls and adherence to the IAEA safeguards system. He called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Lastly, nuclear development must be accompanied by transparency in order to make governments and populations aware of what was at stake and to convince public opinion that nuclear power was an environmentally friendly and safe source of energy.

67. **Mr. Abusseitov** (Kazakhstan) said that the problems that had come up during the review process could lead to inconsistencies between the interpretation of Treaty obligations and the interests of States parties thereto, especially between nuclear-weapon States and others. It was therefore incumbent upon the international community to make the Treaty an effective tool for nuclear disarmament and for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

68. It was essential for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to intensify their arms reduction talks and for them to be joined in that process by the three other nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II paved the way for negotiations on further reductions of strategic arms as well as a package of 1997 ABM arrangements, in particular a memorandum

of understanding on the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the implementation of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, it had become clear that despite the multilateral treaties in force, the international arms control regime was very vulnerable, since even a slight change in global balance and stability could endanger the effectiveness of the international arms control regime as a whole. In that regard, his delegation was concerned over the situation with respect to the ABM Treaty, the preservation of which was an indispensable condition for the process of disarmament.

69. Recognizing the need for overall strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, his delegation supported the entry into force of the CTBT at an early date. By closing the Semipalatinsk test site, his country had made a significant contribution to the nuclear-test ban. He welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and was encouraged by the efforts of the United States Administration to resubmit the issue of ratification to the Senate. There was also a need, in the context of globalization, to strengthen efforts to combat the illegal trade in nuclear material and missile technologies. His country had nearly concluded its internal procedures for joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and was also preparing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.

70. It was extremely important to establish a new climate of openness and transparency in the nuclear field, especially in view of the hundreds of tons of fissile material that would be released as a result of radical reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. Such openness would be helpful in enhancing confidence between States and ensuring that the fissile material would not be misused. His Government favoured the early commencement of negotiations on ending the production of fissile material for military purposes. It was also actively involved in the elaboration of the Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

71. The problem of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States could be solved by adopting a security assurances protocol as an integral part of the NPTO. The provisions of such a protocol should be simple and unambiguous. Greater openness and unrestricted exchange of nuclear material and technologies and of scientific information should facilitate the development of programmes on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He drew attention to the question of the rehabilitation of the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. Nearly two years had passed since the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution urging the international community to assist his Government to rehabilitate that region. A report on the subject would be submitted at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

72. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

73. **Ms. Lindh** (Sweden), endorsing the statement of the European Union and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that 30 years after the entry into force of the NPT, international negotiations on nuclear disarmament were nearly at a standstill. Since 1995, there had been more setbacks than progress in nuclear disarmament. Such setbacks included the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, the violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its NPT obligations and the plans being made by the United States of America to build a national missile defence system, which might spark off a new nuclear missile race. Out of concern for that situation, Sweden, together with several other non-nuclear-weapon States, had launched an initiative in 1998 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

74. Some positive steps had been taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally. They included the systematic implementation of START I ahead of schedule by the United States and the Russian Federation, the unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and efforts by some nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency in the disarmament process and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards.

75. However, those efforts were not enough. There were four areas of particular concern: reducing nuclear arsenals; bringing into force the CTBT; halting the development of new weapons and systems; and keeping nuclear weapons out of regional conflicts. While her delegation welcomed the ratification by the Russian Federation of START II, it remained deeply concerned that the Treaty had still not entered into force seven years after its signature. The Russian Federation and the United States of America must now exercise their special responsibility by bringing START II and its protocol into force and immediately

beginning negotiations on START III. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some nuclear-weapon States should be followed by further cutbacks. There should be transparency in the stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which had no place in the twenty-first century. She welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and urged China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America to follow suit.

76. No State had the right to hold the common security environment hostage to domestic policies. Nor was it acceptable that differences between the nuclear-weapon States on unrelated issues should interfere with the responsibility for making progress on the nuclear arms control agenda. The development of nuclear weapons should cease once and for all. Her Government remained committed to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty which would effectively prevent the further development of nuclear weapons, and it could not accept attempts by China or any other State to block progress on that crucial treaty.

77. Her Government was deeply concerned about the plans by the United States for a national missile defence system. Such action might jeopardize the international balance and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. States parties should refrain from any deployment that could create uncertainties. In that regard, the Russian Federation and the United States of America shared the responsibility for negotiating a solution that would have a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

78. There was a need to halt regional nuclear threats. The nuclear-weapon testing conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had the potential to set off an arms race that would threaten peace and security in South Asia. It was imperative that India and Pakistan should renounce their nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and sign the CTBT. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to be a cause for concern. Iraq should cooperate with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and the countries of the Middle East region should take decisive steps towards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Her delegation hoped for a solution to the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula and urged all the States concerned to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abide by its safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT.

79. Her delegation welcomed the approval in 1997 of a system which would strengthen the ability of IAEA to detect secret nuclear-weapons programmes. However, the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements must be ratified more expeditiously. Illicit trafficking was a threat to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and she therefore urged States to accede to the Physical Protection Convention as soon as possible. Moreover, thought should be given to cooperative measures, including verification, which would strengthen worldwide physical protection. Her Government remained committed to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and welcomed the efforts of IAEA to align its activities in that field more closely with those of developing countries. Any activities related to nuclear applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards, and all countries must accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their commitments.

80. The Conference offered an opportunity for the States parties to add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew international commitment to the full implementation of the NPT. To that end, they should undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the NPT; to do their utmost to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT unconditionally and without delay; to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; to increase transparency in respect of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and stocks of fissile material; and to let the principle of irreversibility guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

81. **Mr. Niehaus** (Costa Rica) condemned the use of or threat to use and the development of nuclear weapons No situation justified the existence of nuclear arsenal given the dangers that lay in the inevitable escalation of military conflict. Once the nuclear fuse was lit, there was no way of avoiding global

conflagration. The nuclear-weapon States must make a genuine commitment to disarmament, deactivate their offensive nuclear systems and dismantle their arsenals. Moreover, they should halt the transfer of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the NPT.

82. His delegation was seriously concerned about the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan and strongly urged all countries that were not yet parties to the NPT to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and become parties to that international instrument as soon as possible, without stipulating conditions. The universality of the NPT should be one of the primary goals of the international community with a view to guaranteeing global security. In that regard, he congratulated the seven States that had ratified the Treaty since 1995. He also appealed to all the States that had not ratified or signed the CTBT to do so shortly. That Treaty's entry into force was an indispensable and urgent step to ensure the security of all humanity. Its prompt ratification was essential to prevent a new arms race. In that regard, he welcomed the recent ratification of the CTBT and START II in the Russian Federation and expressed serious concern at the difficulties that the ratification process had encountered in other States. He was also concerned at the obstacles put in the way of IAEA by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

83. He hoped that all those participating in the Conference would undertake to adopt concrete measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and revive nuclear disarmament talks. The Review Conference should establish a nuclear disarmament agenda for the next five years that included: the establishment of concrete measures such as the early entry into force of the CTBT; the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of fissile material; the strengthening of IAEA and its verification activities; the adoption of additional protocols pursuant to article III of the NPT; and the establishment of a system to guarantee the physical protection of nuclear material.

84. The five nuclear-weapon States had prime responsibility for ensuring that the negotiations referred to in article VI of the NPT were pursued. Lastly, he wished to stress that the financial resources currently devoted to weapons should be used instead to promote socioeconomic development.

Programme of work *(continued)*

85. **The President**, after drawing attention to rule 34 of the rules of procedure, said that Mr. Christopher Weston (Canada) had been nominated Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.

86. *Mr. Weston (Canada) was elected Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.*

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.